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COLLATERALLY ATTACKING THE PRISON
LITIGATION REFORM ACT’S APPLICATION TO
MERITORIOUS PRISONER CIVIL LITIGATION
Melissa Benerofe*
Earlier this year, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) reached its
twenty-fifth birthday, reinvigorating discussion on its effects on people in
prison and the U.S. criminal justice system more broadly. This Note
examines how the PLRA deters and obstructs prisoners’ ability to file
meritorious civil rights lawsuits regarding the conditions of their
confinement. The PLRA does so primarily through four of its provisions,
which this Note refers to as the “access provisions.” The access provisions
include: (1) the exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) the filing fee
provision; (3) the three-strikes rule; and (4) limitations on attorney’s fees.
This Note argues that there is a need for states to counteract the PLRA’s
application to meritorious prisoner litigation not only for the dignity and
well-being of people in prison but also to improve prison conditions overall.
This Note therefore proposes a broad framework to better ensure that
prisoners have a fair opportunity to have their meritorious civil rights claims
reach the court system and, further, succeed. The framework requires states
to: (1) implement electronic grievance systems and (2) grant appropriate
legal aid organizations that typically litigate prisoners’ civil rights cases
with access to those electronic grievance systems. This Note aims to
encourage government actors and scholars to think more critically about
how best to navigate a post-PLRA reality.
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INTRODUCTION
Nowhere else has the destruction of the unprecedented COVID-19
pandemic been more deeply felt than throughout America’s prisons.1 Prisons
are notoriously overcrowded and unsanitary, and they house populations that
are disproportionately susceptible to illnesses.2 All of this coupled with

1. See Lee Kovarsky, Pandemics, Risks, and Remedies, 106 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 71, 73
(2020) (“American criminal detention was ground zero for COVID outbreaks.”).
2. See id. at 73–74.
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initially inadequate responses at the federal3 and state levels4 have resulted
in over 2600 prisoner deaths since the pandemic’s beginning.5 In an effort
to prevent imprisonment from becoming a de facto death sentence, inmates
across the country have flocked to the courts seeking relief,6 whether it be
for compassionate release, transfer to home confinement, or on the basis that
their constitutional rights have been violated by inadequate protections
against COVID-19.7
However, even in the present crisis, prisoner lawsuits alleging
constitutional violations have been thwarted8 by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 19959 (PLRA or “the Act”), an under-the-radar piece of Clinton-era
legislation that has made it considerably harder for prisoners10 to challenge
their conditions of confinement11 in federal court.12

3. See Kim Bellware, Prisoners and Guards Agree About Federal Coronavirus
Response:
“We Do Not Feel Safe”, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2020, 2:16 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/08/24/prisoners-guards-agree-about-federalcoronavirus-response-we-do-not-feel-safe/ [https://perma.cc/5CFR-RYUH].
4. See Emily Widra & Dylan Hayre, Failing Grades: States’ Responses to COVID-19
in
Jails
&
Prisons,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(June
25,
2020),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/failing_grades.html [https://perma.cc/S3A7-7QWM]
(concluding that “despite all of the information, voices calling for action, and the obvious
need, state responses ranged from disorganized or ineffective, at best, to callously nonexistent
at worst”).
5. See A State-by-State Look at 15 Months of Coronavirus in Prisons, MARSHALL
PROJECT,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/a-state-by-state-look-atcoronavirus-in-prisons [https://perma.cc/282K-YCEG] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
6. See Michael Gelb, ‘Dozens of Prisons’ Targeted in COVID-19 Civil Rights Lawsuits,
CRIME REPORT (July 30, 2020), https://thecrimereport.org/2020/07/30/civil-rights-lawsuitstarget-prison-response-to-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/Z45U-DJ2V].
7. See Ariane de Vogue, Covid-19 Cases Concerning Prisoners’ Rights Hit the Supreme
Court, CNN (May 21, 2020, 7:01 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/21/politics/covid-19supreme-court-prisoners-rights/index.html [https://perma.cc/MRL8-J9CF].
8. See, e.g., Valentine v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 1598, 1598 (2020) (mem.) (affirming the
Fifth Circuit’s denial of an injunction which would require a Texas geriatric prison to make
enhanced efforts to contain the coronavirus due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies
pursuant to the PLRA).
9. Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–10, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to -77 (1996) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
10. The PLRA defines “prisoner” as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility
who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of
criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary
program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). However, this Note focuses on individuals in prison or those
who have already been convicted of a crime. This Note uses the terms “prisoner,” “inmate,”
and “person in prison” interchangeably.
11. The phrase “conditions of confinement” includes “all inmate suits about prison life,
whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
12. See John Pfaff, The 1994 Crime Law Hogs the Legal Reform Spotlight. But a
Lesser-Known Law Deserves More Attention, APPEAL (Oct. 2, 2019),
https://theappeal.org/1994-crime-law-biden/ [https://perma.cc/RCV4-CCKF]. The PLRA
does not apply to habeas corpus petitions and criminal appeals, as it is restricted to civil
actions. See Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 634 (7th Cir. 2000).
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In 1996, Congress enacted the PLRA in response to a perceived
overabundance of frivolous13 inmate civil rights litigation, which Congress
deemed highly costly for the federal court system and state governments.14
While Congress’s stated intention in passing the PLRA was to curtail
frivolous lawsuits,15 the Act has in fact deterred and obstructed the filing of
meritorious civil rights lawsuits,16 resulting in a significant reduction of
prisoner lawsuits in the federal courts.17 It has done so primarily through
four of its provisions:18 (1) the administrative exhaustion requirement; (2)
the filing fee provision, (3) the three-strikes rule, and (4) limitations on
attorney’s fees. This Note refers to these provisions as the PLRA’s “access
provisions.” This Note examines how these particular provisions deter and
obstruct the filing of meritorious civil rights lawsuits, consequently
diminishing the already lacking transparency of prison conditions
nationwide.
Part I discusses how prisons typically operate with minimal transparency,
enabling troubling prison conditions to persist. It then provides a brief
history of how federal litigation improved state prison conditions,
particularly from the 1960s to the 1980s. Part I concludes by highlighting
the rise in so-called “frivolous” prisoner litigation that culminated in the early
to mid-1990s and served as the basis for the PLRA’s enactment.
Part II describes the PLRA’s access provisions in detail and explores how
these provisions deter and obstruct the filing of meritorious prisoner civil
rights lawsuits. In doing so, Part II concludes that the PLRA has tampered
with the only real transparency mechanism for exposing prison conditions.
Finally, Part III argues that there is a need to combat the access provisions’
application to meritorious prisoner civil litigation. To address this need, Part
III proposes that states implement a two-step framework. This proposed
framework takes a broad approach, so as to give the best chance for practical
implementation. More specifically, this Note argues that: (1) states should
require that prison grievance processes are conducted primarily via electronic
means to ensure that all grievances are stored in an electronic database and
(2) states should require that appropriate outside legal aid organizations be
given access to those electronic grievance databases in order to facilitate
attorney representation.
13. This Note uses the term “frivolous” to mean that which lacks an arguable basis in law
or fact.
14. See infra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.
15. See 141 CONG. REC. 27,041–42 (1995).
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See infra notes 250–52 and accompanying text.
18. The PLRA has several other provisions which are not the focus of this Note. A few
of those provisions include: a requirement that a prisoner cannot bring a lawsuit without a
prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); a
screening provision whereby a court must dismiss a prisoner’s case if it determines that the
complaint is “frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief,” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c)(1); and provisions restricting the ability for federal judges to grant prospective
relief, see 18 U.S.C. § 3626.
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I. BREAKING DOWN THE BARRIER BETWEEN PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC:
THE IMPORTANCE OF PRISONER LITIGATION
This part discusses how prisoner litigation has traditionally served as one
of the only effective transparency mechanisms for prisoners to expose the
realities of prison life to the outside world. Part I.A briefly describes several
barriers that prevent the public from knowing what occurs behind prison
walls. Given these barriers, Part I.B highlights how prisoner civil rights
litigation is one of the only means to expose and improve prison conditions.
Part I.C then provides context for the PLRA’s enactment by recounting the
rise in so-called frivolous prisoner litigation.
A. Barriers to Public Access of Prisons
State prisons in the United States house approximately 1.3 million people19
and receive significant funding through taxpayer dollars.20 Despite the
number of people and costs involved, state prisons remain “shrouded in
secrecy.”21 In large part, this comes as a result of several barriers to public
access, including geographic separation, limits on media access and external
communication, inefficacy of public disclosure laws, and a general lack of
independent prison oversight.22
First, prisons are physically separated from the public at large.23 Typically
located in geographically remote, rural locations,24 the heavily guarded and
closed environment of prisons naturally hides them from public view.25 As
one historian put it: “Prisons are built to be out of sight and are, thus, out of
mind.”26

19. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html
[https://perma.cc/QZ4D-EZCQ] (displaying slideshow showing 1,291,000 people in state
prisons).
20. See Nicole Lewis & Beatrix Lockwood, The Hidden Cost of Incarceration,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2019/12/17/the-hidden-cost-of-incarceration [https://perma.cc/5ARC-PWE3] (noting how the
United States spends more than $80 billion each year to keep roughly 2.3 million people
behind bars).
21. Andrea C. Armstrong, No Prisoner Left Behind?: Enhancing Public Transparency of
Penal Institutions, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 435, 462 (2014).
22. See infra notes 23–39 and accompanying text.
23. See Michele Deitch, The Need for Independent Prison Oversight in a Post-PLRA
World, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 236, 236 (2012) (“Prisons and jails are closed institutions, both
literally and symbolically, and they operate far away from public view.”).
24. See Laura Rovner, On Litigating Constitutional Challenges to the Federal Supermax:
Improving Conditions and Shining a Light, 95 DENV. L. REV. 457, 461 (2018).
25. David C. Fathi, The Challenge of Prison Oversight, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1453, 1453
(2010).
26. Heather Ann Thompson, What’s Hidden Behind the Walls of America’s Prisons,
CONVERSATION (June 4, 2017, 9:45 PM), https://theconversation.com/whats-hidden-behindthe-walls-of-americas-prisons-77282 [https://perma.cc/CU2H-SYVR].
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Second, media access to prisons is limited and subject to the discretion of
corrections officials.27 Additionally, although incarcerated people can
communicate with members of the public, external prisoner communication
remains subject to prison surveillance, making it difficult to obtain an
unfiltered prisoner viewpoint.28
Third, public disclosure laws do not provide full transparency of prison
conditions. In addition to the Freedom of Information Act29 (FOIA), which
governs the disclosure of government records at the federal level, all fifty
states have open records statutes, many of which are modeled off FOIA.30
These statutes are meant to embody a commitment to openness and
transparency.31 However, state departments of correction (DOCs) often take
long to respond to disclosure requests or fail to respond altogether.32 In
addition, DOCs frequently rely on statutory exemptions in public disclosure
laws, which often preclude public access to information regarding law
enforcement.33 The common response to an open records request about
prison conditions is that public access to the requested documents would
“threaten the security of the institution” by possibly resulting in “prison riots,
public disturbances, and increases in violent crime within prison walls.”34
Thus, in the prison context, public disclosure laws do not freely grant the
public access to information about prison conditions.35

27. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbot, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78, 89 (1987); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827–28 (1974); see also Rovner, supra note
24, at 462–63.
28. Demetria D. Frank, Prisoner-to-Public Communication, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 115, 117
(2018).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
30. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (2002); see also Christina Koningisor,
Transparency Deserts, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1461, 1506 (2020) (stating that while many state
public records statutes have adopted certain parts or features of FOIA, each state law remains
unique).
31. See Solove, supra note 30, at 1161.
32. See, e.g., Sarah Geraghty & Melanie Velez, Bringing Transparency and
Accountability to Criminal Justice Institutions in the South, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 455,
461–62 (2011) (explaining how the Alabama DOC continuously ignored Open Records Act
requests for months and only provided the requested documents after repeated threats of
litigation); Florida Department of Corrections Sued over Failure to Provide Public Records
Related to COVID-19 Policies, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (May 15, 2020),
https://www.splcenter.org/presscenter/florida-department-corrections-sued-over-failureprovide-public-records-related-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/GRH9-LB9U] (discussing how for
almost two months the Florida DOC failed to respond to public records requests by the
Southern Poverty Law Center asking for information about policies to deal with the
COVID-19 pandemic).
33. FOIA contains nine broad categories of government records exempt from public
disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). In contrast, state public disclosure laws can contain hundreds
of enumerated exemptions which tend to sweep broadly. See, e.g., Koningisor, supra note 30,
at 1506 (explaining how Florida’s open records law contains 1000 exemptions to public
disclosure).
34. Armstrong, supra note 21, at 464.
35. See Michele Deitch, But Who Oversees the Overseers?: The Status of Prison and Jail
Oversight in the United States, 47 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 222–23 (2020).

2021]

PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT

147

Lastly, a lack of independent prison oversight enables prisons to generally
operate without public scrutiny.36 Despite having one of the highest rates of
incarceration worldwide, the United States lacks a national comprehensive
mechanism for the routine inspection and monitoring of all confinement
facilities.37 At the state level, nonjudicial independent oversight of
correctional facilities has been described as “spotty and in many jurisdictions
nonexistent.”38 While some states have implemented different types of
independent monitoring and investigative agencies,39 they remain the
minority.
Thus, prison conditions lack transparency, leaving many Americans in the
dark about the realities of prison life.40 This has enabled unspeakable abuse
of men and women to occur behind prison walls.41 More specifically,
extreme overcrowding, routine violence, sexual misconduct, and inadequate
physical and mental health care consistently plague federal and state
correctional facilities throughout the United States.42
The COVID-19 pandemic has further exposed and exacerbated these
existing deficiencies. Prisons remain “cramped, unhygienic, and designed to
inhibit a person’s ability to protect themselves.”43 Without the opportunity
to practice social distancing or frequent handwashing in typically unsanitary
and crowded environments,44 “inmates everywhere have been rendered
vulnerable and often powerless to protect themselves from harm.”45 To
minimize the spread of the virus, prison systems have placed prisoners in
36. See Armstrong, supra note 21, at 467.
37. See Fathi, supra note 25, at 1454 (noting that the “United States has no independent
national agency that monitors prison conditions”).
38. Id. at 1460; see also Michele Deitch, Independent Correctional Oversight
Mechanisms Across the United States: A 50-State Inventory, 30 PACE L. REV. 1754, 1762
(2010) (finding that formal and comprehensive external oversight among the states is “truly
rare”).
39. See, e.g., Deitch, supra note 38, at 1788. Professor Michele Deitch’s most recent
overview in 2020 of correctional oversight mechanisms throughout the United States noted
that in the past few years, several states have established or strengthened existing independent
prison oversight. See Deitch, supra note 35, at 246; see, e.g., H.B. 1552, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Haw. 2019) (establishing the independent Hawaii Correctional System Oversight
Commission); A.B. 3979, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2019) (strengthening the Office of the
Corrections Ombudsperson, an independent office that reports directly to the governor, in New
Jersey).
40. See Rovner, supra note 24, at 461; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
41. See Deitch, supra note 23, at 236 (“In such closed environments, abuse is more likely
to occur and less likely to be discovered.”); Thompson, supra note 26.
42. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prisons, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
881, 887–89 (2009).
43. Dylan Hayre, How State Governments Across the Country Failed to Protect Our
Communities From COVID-19, ACLU (July 2, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/criminallaw-reform/how-state-governments-across-the-country-failed-to-protect-our-communitiesfrom-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/RS6N-G37F].
44. See Aleks Kajstura & Jenny Landon, Since You Asked: Is Social Distancing Possible
Behind
Bars?,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Apr.
3,
2020),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/04/03/density/
[https://perma.cc/5M5X-XQ9V]
(demonstrating that social distancing is impossible behind bars and access to necessary
hygiene products is lacking).
45. Valentine v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 1598, 1601 (2020) (mem.).
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lockdown or solitary confinement.46 As a result, prisons across the country
have further closed their doors by suspending family visits, halting
inspections by outside agencies, and limiting prisoners’ communications
with the outside world.47
Despite these efforts to contain the virus, there have been devastating
consequences. As of May 30, 2021, more than 390,000 people in prison have
tested positive for COVID-19, and over 2600 inmates have died as a result.48
B. Federal Litigation: Exposing and Reforming Prison Conditions
While the aforementioned barriers have largely kept the public shielded
from the realities of life behind bars, prisoners have taken matters into their
own hands. Thus, it is important to note how federal litigation has
historically improved prison conditions, making the current conditions “less
brutal” and inhumane than in years past.49
Without political representation,50 prisoners have turned their attention to
the federal courts to have their voices heard.51 However, they have not
always been met with open arms. Prior to the 1960s, courts took a
“hands-off” approach to prison oversight, leaving prisoners vulnerable to the
unchecked authority of correctional officers and staff.52 This approach was
grounded in the notion that a prisoner, as a convicted criminal, was a “slave
of the state” and was not entitled to any legal rights enjoyed by free citizens.53
Federal courts further justified nonintervention with concerns over separation
of powers and a lack of judicial expertise in handling corrections
operations.54

46. See Joseph Shapiro, As COVID-19 Spreads in Prisons, Lockdowns Spark Fear of
More Solitary Confinement, NPR (June 15, 2020, 4:53 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2020/06/15/877457603/as-covid-spreads-in-u-s-prisons-lockdowns-spark-fear-of-moresolitary-confinemen [https://perma.cc/MQ2Y-THWS].
47. See Keri Blakinger, As COVID-19 Measures Grow, Prison Oversight Falls,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 17, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2020/03/17/as-covid-19-measures-grow-prison-oversight-falls
[https://perma.cc/WUW9LLJ7].
48. See A State-by-State Look at 15 Months of Coronavirus in Prisons, supra note 5.
49. See Margo Schlanger, The Constitutional Law of Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103
CORNELL L. REV. 357, 359 (2018) (“And while American jails and prisons are less brutal and
unhealthy now than they were in the 1970s . . . current conditions behind bars are sometimes
horrendous.”); Van Swearingen, Imprisoning Rights: The Failure of Negotiated Governance
in the Prison Inmate Grievance Process, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1353, 1358 (2008).
50. See Frank, supra note 28, at 116 (describing how prisoners have no political power to
challenge conditions of the prison system).
51. See Swearingen, supra note 49, at 1358 n.32.
52. Hedieh Nasheri, A Spirit of Meanness: Courts, Prisons and Prisoners, 27 CUMB. L.
REV. 1173, 1175 (1997).
53. See id.; see also, e.g., Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 798 (1871)
(finding that a prisoner is “for the time being a slave, in a condition of penal servitude to the
State, and is subject to such laws and regulations as the State may choose to prescribe”).
54. Ira P. Robbins, The Cry of Wolfish in the Federal Courts: The Future of Federal
Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 212
(1980).
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Federal courts began to depart from this traditional “hands-off” policy in
the 1960s.55 In 1961, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape,56
which opened the door for prisoners to file civil rights lawsuits pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 198357 over prison conditions that allegedly violated their
constitutional rights. In 1964, the Court, in Cooper v. Pate,58 solidified a
state prisoner’s right to bring a claim under § 1983.59
As a result of these landmark decisions, federal litigation became an
effective transparency mechanism to expose the realities of prison conditions
nationwide. A civil rights lawsuit provided the public with an unfiltered
glimpse into the conditions of prison confinement.60 People in prison then
had the ability to effectively force judges to face the realities of the
“appalling” conditions of penal institutions in some states.61
From the 1960s onward, people in state prisons increasingly utilized
§ 1983 claims as a valuable tool to improve their prison conditions.62 Courts
recognized a prisoner’s ability to seek relief for violations of various
constitutional rights, including the right to be free from excessive force by
corrections officers and the rights to adequate medical care, religious
freedom, and due process in disciplinary proceedings.63 One of the most
important rights recognized by the courts was a prisoner’s fundamental right
to access the courts in the first place.64 Federal courts acknowledged that “an
inmate’s right of unfettered access to the courts is as fundamental a right as
any other . . . . All other rights of an inmate are illusory without it,” as they
55. See Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and
Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 558–59 (2006).
56. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
57. The section reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
58. 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam).
59. See id. at 546. Federal prisoners have a parallel right to bring constitutional claims
against the federal government. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390–97 (1971).
60. See Ken Strutin, Litigating from the Prison of the Mind: A Cognitive Right to
Post-Conviction Counsel, 14 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 343, 367–68 (2016).
61. Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the Provision of
Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 424 (1993).
62. See Allen E. Honick, It’s “Exhausting”: Reconciling a Prisoner’s Right to
Meaningful Remedies for Constitutional Violations with the Need for Agency Autonomy, 45
U. BALT. L. REV. 155, 160–61 (2015).
63. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (recognizing the right to be free from
excessive force); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (recognizing the right to adequate
medical care); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556–57 (1974) (recognizing the right to
minimum due process protections in proceedings to strip prisoners’ good-time credits); Cruz
v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (recognizing the right to religious freedom).
64. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977), abrogated by Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343 (1996).
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are “entirely dependent for their existence on the whim or caprice of the
prison warden.”65
In addition to recognizing a prisoner’s ability to recover for violations of
their constitutional rights, federal courts demonstrated a willingness to take
a step further. In the 1970s, courts began to order long-term structural reform
of state prison systems.66 These federal court orders ended some of the most
cruel and inhumane practices and conditions in prisons throughout the
country. For example, federal court orders halted routine practices in the
“dark and evil world” of Arkansas’s prisons,67 such as lashing prisoners for
minor infractions with a wooden-handled, five-foot long leather strap until
their skin was bloody;68 giving prisoners electrical shocks to sensitive parts
of their body from a hand-cranked device known as the “Tucker
telephone”;69 and crowding prisoners into barracks where “rape was so
common and uncontrolled that some potential victims dared not sleep.”70
Without the initial filing of a civil rights lawsuit, these injustices would have
never been exposed and subsequently terminated.71
By the early 1980s, prisons in twenty-five states were subject to
comprehensive court orders to reform prison conditions.72 By 1995,
forty-one states had prison orders to either reduce overcrowding or eliminate
other unconstitutional conditions of confinement, with 37 percent of those
states under system-wide regulation.73
C. The Prelude to the PLRA: The So-Called Rise of Frivolous Prisoner
Litigation
In addition to the growing number of federal court orders, the number of
prisoner civil rights filings also increased. As the Supreme Court once
recognized: “What for a private citizen would be a dispute with his landlord,
with his employer, with his tailor, with his neighbor, or with his banker
becomes, for the prisoner, a dispute with the State.”74 Whereas the number
of federal prisoner civil rights filings was 3620 in 1972, that number rose to
approximately 39,000 in 1995,75 comprising 19 percent of the federal civil

65. Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 1973).
66. See generally Schlanger, supra note 55 (providing a detailed account of the history of
prison court-order litigation).
67. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681 (1978) (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362,
381 (E.D. Ark. 1970)).
68. See id. at 682 n.4.
69. See id. at 682 n.5.
70. Id. at 681 n.3.
71. See Darryl M. James, Note, Reforming Prison Litigation Reform: Reclaiming Equal
Access to Justice for Incarcerated Persons in America, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 465, 471 (2011)
(“Without exposing injustice and abuse through landmark litigation like Hutto, these horrible
conditions will not be rectified.”).
72. See Swearingen, supra note 49, at 1357.
73. See Schlanger, supra note 55, at 577.
74. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973).
75. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1583 (2003).
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docket.76 This increase was primarily associated with a simultaneously
growing incarcerated population in nearly every state.77
Despite notable legal victories, such as the ones previously described,
many prisoner civil rights lawsuits were unsuccessful.78 One explanation of
the lack of success was that an overwhelming percentage of cases were filed
and litigated pro se.79 Many prisoners suffer from literacy and language
deficits, as well as mental health issues that impair their ability to draft
well-pled complaints and advocate on their own behalf.80 Even if an inmate
is fully capable, restricted access to libraries, legal materials, the internet, and
telephones makes preparing a case difficult.81 Furthermore, pro se prisoners
face an uphill battle in conducting effective discovery not only due to a lack
of legal skills and financing to fund discovery costs but also because of
resistance by prisons and judges to share necessary information.82 Because
of these deficits, pro se prisoners understandably struggle to successfully
litigate an otherwise meritorious civil rights case.83 It is thus no surprise that
prisoner civil rights cases with attorney representation fared much better than
cases brought pro se.84
An alternative explanation for the high rates of dismissal, as the PLRA’s
proponents in Congress argued,85 was that the bulk of inmate civil rights
cases lacked sufficient merit.86 While it is true that there were many
frivolous cases, this argument slightly mischaracterizes what was really
taking place.87 For instance, many of the so-called frivolous cases were
76. Id. at 1558. Although the rise of the total number of prisoners’ lawsuits was readily
apparent, the rate at which prisoners filed civil rights lawsuits nevertheless declined between
1980 and 1996. See Allen W. Burton, Note, Prisoners’ Suits for Money Damages: An
Exception to the Administrative Exhaustion Requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1359, 1368 (2001); see also Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1583.
77. See Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1586–87.
78. See id. at 1594; Burton, supra note 76, at 1367 (“According to the National
Association of Attorneys General, more than 95% of inmate civil rights suits are dismissed in
favor of the defendant.”).
79. See Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1609–10. Inmate civil rights cases were also litigated
pro se far more than cases involving nonprisoners. See id. at 1609; see also infra Part II.B.4.a.
(explaining the difficulties prisoners have in obtaining counsel).
80. See Michael W. Martin, Foreword: Root Causes of the Pro Se Prisoner Litigation
Crisis, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1219, 1225–26 (2011); see also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,
496 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“In a community where illiteracy and mental deficiency
is [sic] notoriously high, it is not enough to ask the prisoner to be his own lawyer.”).
81. Martin, supra note 80, at 1226.
82. See Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1611.
83. To the contrary, lawyers possess “[t]he ability to build a case, strategize in accordance
with a case theory, avoid pleading and discovery pitfalls, [and] survive motion practice.”
Martin, supra note 80, at 1226.
84. See Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1610 (noting that among cases terminated in 2000,
“counseled cases were three times as likely as pro se cases to have recorded settlements,
two-thirds more likely to go to trial, and two-and-a-half times as likely to end in a plaintiff’s
victory at trial”).
85. See infra notes 103–09 and accompanying text.
86. See Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1599 (finding that the pre-PLRA data establishes that
the inmate docket tends to have a low probability of litigated success).
87. See, e.g., Jon O. Newman, Opinion, No More Myths About Prisoner Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 3, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/03/opinion/l-no-more-myths-about-
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legally frivolous, not substantively so. While an inmate may have
experienced some legitimate form of harm, the claim was barred due to
doctrines such as immunity.88 Nevertheless, some prisoner civil rights
lawsuits were, in fact, substantively frivolous and garnered a significant
amount of media attention.89 The media, with the help of the National
Association of Attorneys General, put these so-called frivolous cases on
public display in “Top Ten Frivolous Filings Lists,”90 which highlighted
several notorious examples: an inmate suing because the piece of cake on
his dinner tray was “hacked up,” an inmate suing because corrections
officials took away his Gameboy electronic game, or, most famously, an
inmate suing because he was served chunky instead of smooth peanut
butter.91
These lists publicly portrayed inmate civil rights cases as wholly devoid
of merit.92 But the reality appeared more complex, with some describing
how these lists included accounts that were “at best highly misleading and,
sometimes, simply false.”93 For example, in the chunky peanut butter case,
the inmate was not suing merely because he received chunky instead of
creamy peanut butter; he was actually complaining that his prison account
had been incorrectly charged $2.50 for a jar of peanut butter he never
received.94 As Second Circuit Judge Jon O. Newman explained, although
$2.50 is not a large sum of money, “such a sum is not trivial to the prisoner
whose limited prison funds are improperly debited.”95 This is just one
example of how the dominant public narrative not only failed to acknowledge
this more nuanced reality but also did not adequately emphasize the other
side of the story—that there remained inmates bringing meritorious cases
alleging serious constitutional violations.96

prisoner-lawsuits-041220.html [https://perma.cc/VK9U-CAZF] (arguing that “those in
responsible positions ought not to ridicule all prisoner lawsuits by perpetuating myths about
them”).
88. See Burton, supra note 76, at 1367 n.74. A legally frivolous complaint lacks an
arguable basis in law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989).
89. Burton, supra note 76, at 1367 n.74 (“While the mass media focuses on cases that are
substantively frivolous, dismissals for legal frivolousness are far more common.”).
Substantively frivolous claims include allegations that are “fantastic” and “delusional.”
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 328.
90. See Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1568.
91. See 141 CONG. REC. 27,045 (1995); Jennifer A. Puplava, Note, Peanut Butter and
Politics: An Evaluation of the Separation-of-Powers Issues in Section 802 of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 73 IND. L.J. 329, 330–31 (1997).
92. See Burton, supra note 76, at 1368.
93. Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 519, 520 (1996).
94. See Pfaff, supra note 12 (noting how the reality of the chunky peanut butter case was
“far more complex” than how it was portrayed); Alysia Santo, Suing From Prison, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Feb. 18, 2015, 4:45 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/02/18/suingfrom-prison [https://perma.cc/ZHK5-JJDR].
95. Newman, supra note 93, at 522.
96. See Burton, supra note 76, at 1368–69 (discussing how media coverage failed to
mention legitimate inmate claims and, in doing so, distorted the public’s view).
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II. BROKEN PROMISES: THE PLRA’S DETERRENCE AND OBSTRUCTION OF
MERITORIOUS LAWSUITS
To address the perceived problem of a burgeoning number of frivolous
prisoner civil rights lawsuits, Congress passed the PLRA.97 The PLRA
imposes three types of limitations on inmates challenging prison conditions
in federal court: “restrictions on the powers of the federal courts; restrictions
on the relief available in prisoner cases; and restrictions on the ability of
prisoner litigants to get into court.”98
The PLRA seeks to reduce frivolous prisoner civil rights lawsuits through
the following access provisions: (1) a requirement that a prisoner exhaust
available administrative remedies prior to bringing suit in federal court;99 (2)
the imposition of filing fee payments for prisoners who qualify for in forma
pauperis status;100 (3) the “three-strikes” rule that bars plaintiffs who have
filed three civil actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or
failing to state a cause of action;101 and (4) limitations on attorney’s fees
awards.102
This Note analyzes each of the PLRA’s access provisions in order to
develop a synthesized understanding of how states can confront the PLRA’s
negative effects. Part II.A describes Congress’s stated purpose for the
PLRA’s access provisions, specifically noting its intent to target only
frivolous lawsuits. Part II.B shows that the PLRA has not lived up to
Congress’s stated purpose, explaining how the Act’s access provisions deter
and obstruct meritorious prisoner civil rights lawsuits. Part II.C then
examines the PLRA’s overall impact.
A. The Stated Purpose of the PLRA’s Access Provisions
The stated purpose of the PLRA was “to discourage frivolous and abusive
prison lawsuits.”103 The PLRA’s limited legislative history shows that the
Act’s proponents emphasized how the overwhelming number of frivolous
prisoner lawsuits “tie up the courts, waste valuable legal resources, and affect
the quality of justice enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”104 The PLRA,
Congress believed, would help put an end to a “ridiculous waste of taxpayers’
97. The PLRA was part of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321. As such, its provisions are scattered throughout
the U.S. Code.
98. See Elizabeth Alexander, Prison Litigation Reform Act Raises the Bar, 16 CRIM. JUST.
10, 11 (2002). This Note focuses on the last category of restrictions. In addition to reducing
frivolous lawsuits, the PLRA’s other main goal was to limit federal judicial involvement in
the administration of state prisons. See 141 CONG. REC. 27,042 (1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (stating that “courts have gone too far in micromanaging our Nation’s prisons”).
99. See infra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
100. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
101. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 208–13 and accompanying text.
103. 141 CONG. REC. 27,041 (1995). Although not discussed in this Note, the PLRA’s
other stated purpose was “[t]o provide for appropriate remedies for prison condition lawsuits.”
Id.
104. Id. at 27,042 (statement of Sen. Dole).
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money”105 and what it called the “inmate litigation fun-and-games.”106 To
demonstrate these “fun-and-games,” members of Congress used anecdotes
of fantastical cases, most notably the cases highlighted in the “Top Ten
Frivolous Filings Lists.”107
Congress assured that the PLRA’s target was not set on meritorious
prisoner litigation. For example, Senator Orrin Hatch, chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, emphasized that he “d[id] not want to prevent inmates
from raising legitimate claims” and that the PLRA would not do so.108 He
further stated that the “crushing burden of these frivolous suits makes it
difficult for the courts to consider meritorious claims,” thus implying that if
frivolous cases were reduced, meritorious claims could receive proper court
attention.109
However, then-Senator Joe Biden noticed early on that the PLRA’s ability
to target only frivolous cases might be unrealistic. While acknowledging the
need to deal with an overburdened court system, largely because of the influx
of prisoner civil rights cases, Biden worried that “in an effort to curb
frivolous prisoner lawsuits, [the PLRA] places too many roadblocks to
meritorious prison lawsuits.”110 Yet, despite these concerns, Congress
passed the PLRA, and President Bill Clinton signed it into law on April 26,
1996.111
B. How the PLRA Deters and Obstructs Meritorious Civil Rights Lawsuits
Biden’s worries quickly became, and continue to be, the practical reality.
Despite Congress’s stated intent to put an end only to frivolous inmate filings,
the PLRA has in fact deterred and obstructed inmates’ ability to file
meritorious civil rights lawsuits. This part analyzes how exactly the Act does
so, by exploring each of the PLRA’s access provisions in detail.
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Perhaps the most impactful access provision of the PLRA is the mandatory
exhaustion requirement.112 Section 1997e(a) provides: “No action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or
any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

105. Id. (statement of Sen. Hatch). Senator Hatch emphasized that the “huge costs imposed
on State governments to defend against these meritless suits is another kind of crime
committed against law-abiding citizens.” Id.
106. Id. (statement of Sen. Dole).
107. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
108. 141 CONG. REC. 27,042 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 27,044 (statement of Sen. Biden); Puplava, supra note 91, at 331–32.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
112. See Derek Borchardt, Note, The Iron Curtain Redrawn Between Prisoners and the
Constitution, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 469, 470–71 (2012) (recognizing the exhaustion
requirement as the PLRA’s largest hurdle).
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correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.”113
The administrative remedies to be exhausted are not defined within the
PLRA but are rather determined by the particular processes spelled out in a
prison’s internal grievance procedure.114 For state prisons, state DOCs
promulgate grievance procedures pursuant to broad legislative authority.115
Though the process differs between states, many states’ grievance policies
follow a similar structure.116 A typical policy requires a prisoner to complete
multiple levels of review, beginning first with seeking a remedy through
informal resolution and then pursuing more formal protocols if a favorable
outcome is not attained.117 These formal protocols often have numerous
procedural technicalities, such as using the correct form, attaching
appropriate documentation, naming all individuals involved in an alleged
incident, and even using the proper ink color.118 If a formal grievance results
in denial, a prisoner must usually follow a detailed appeal process, which
sometimes requires two levels of appeal.119 Prisoners must adhere to strict
time requirements—typically consisting of mere days—when proceeding
through each stage of the process.120 Only once all stages have been
completed will an inmate be deemed to have exhausted administrative
remedies.121 As described below, under the PLRA, prisoners must exhaust
administrative remedies before having their cases heard on the merits, thus
making prisons’ grievance procedures a barrier of access to the formal justice
system.

113. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
114. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (“The level of detail necessary in a
grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim
to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of
proper exhaustion.”). Nearly all states have some form of a general grievance policy, which
outlines the appropriate steps an inmate must take to air a grievance. Borchardt, supra note
112, at 492. For a detailed account of grievance policies from state DOCs, see generally
PRIYAH KAUL ET AL., PRISON AND JAIL GRIEVANCE POLICIES: LESSONS FROM A FIFTY-STATE
SURVEY
(2015),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/policyclearinghouse/
Site%20Documents/FOIAReport10.18.15.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/MXU5-93SP].
115. See Borchardt, supra note 112, at 490–91.
116. Id. at 492.
117. Id. at 492–93.
118. Id. at 493.
119. Id. at 493–94.
120. Id. at 494.
121. Id.
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The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement “invigorated the exhaustion
prescription”122 by making exhaustion mandatory.123 The purpose of the
exhaustion requirement was to “reduce the quantity and improve the quality
of prisoner suits” by affording corrections officials with an opportunity to
address prisoners’ complaints internally before resorting to the courts.124
An exhaustion requirement can offer several benefits.125
For
administrative bodies, it can preserve their autonomy and allow them to
handle internal grievances according to their own special expertise.126 For
courts, it can lighten caseloads by limiting the need for judicial review.127
And even for potential plaintiffs, it may be beneficial if complaints can be
more quickly resolved, thus making judicial involvement unnecessary.128
However, this section demonstrates how an exhaustion requirement is
particularly problematic when applied to prisoners’ meritorious complaints.
This section begins by exploring courts’ strict application of the exhaustion
requirement and then turns to a discussion of the increasing complexity of
prison grievance procedures.
a. Strict Application of Exhaustion
Courts have consistently applied a strict textual interpretation of the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Such a strict application is a product of a
series of Supreme Court cases in which the Court intensified the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement as a significant procedural hurdle for inmates to
overcome.129 As the decisions demonstrate, mandatory exhaustion applies
regardless of a lawsuit’s merit, with only one narrow textual exception.130
The practical effect is that courts must dismiss a prisoner’s case without
considering the claim’s merits if the prisoner-plaintiff has not previously
completed all requisite stages of a prison’s internal grievance process.

122. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement
amended the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA). Pub. L. No. 96–247, 94
Stat. 349, 352 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e). CRIPA required a prisoner
to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit regarding prison conditions only if
the particular prison’s internal grievance process had been certified by the attorney general as
“plain, speedy, and effective.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524; Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1627. See
generally Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Enigmatic Exhaustion
Requirement: What It Means and What Congress, Courts and Correctional Officials Can
Learn from It, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 483, 493–96 (2001) (detailing CRIPA’s framework).
Moreover, courts could use discretion and decide if requiring exhaustion was ultimately
“appropriate and in the interests of justice.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 523 (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)–(b)).
123. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 524.
124. Id. at 524–25.
125. See Burton, supra note 76, at 1372–74 (describing the benefits of the exhaustion
requirement in general).
126. See id. at 1372–73.
127. See id. at 1373.
128. See id.
129. See infra notes 131–48 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 131–48 and accompanying text.
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In Booth v. Churner131 and Porter v. Nussle,132 the Supreme Court
clarified the applicability of PLRA exhaustion to specific types of claims. In
Booth, the Court held that a prisoner who alleged that corrections officers
assaulted him and denied him medical attention to treat his resulting injuries
was still required to exhaust administrative remedies despite the
impossibility of receiving requested monetary compensation through the
prison’s grievance process.133 When addressing the inability of the grievance
system to provide the requested relief, the Court emphasized that it would
“not read futility or other exceptions into [the PLRA’s] exhaustion
requirement[].”134 As a result, the Court affirmed the dismissal of Booth’s
otherwise meritorious claim based on his failure to exhaust the prison’s
grievance process.135
In Porter, the Court held that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies
to individual instances of excessive force.136 In doing so, the Court clarified
that the exhaustion requirement “applies to all prisoners seeking redress for
prison circumstances or occurrences.”137 Thus, the Court rejected an
interpretation of the exhaustion provision that would create an exception for
excessive force claims, rationalizing that Congress did not intend to divide
inmates’ claims into two discrete subcategories.138
While Booth and Porter clarified the applicability of PLRA exhaustion to
different types of claims, the Court’s 2006 decision in Woodford v. Ngo139
dictated the precise manner in which exhaustion itself must be achieved. In
Woodford, the Court held that “proper exhaustion of administrative remedies
is necessary,” meaning that an inmate must strictly meet all institutional
deadlines and procedures of a prison’s internal grievance procedure prior to
filing a civil action regarding prison conditions in federal court.140 In setting
“proper exhaustion” as the standard for satisfying PLRA exhaustion, the
Woodford majority was relatively unsympathetic to the fact that such a
standard could be “harsh for prisoners, who generally are untrained in the
law and are often poorly educated.”141 The Court also rejected the argument
that the “proper exhaustion” doctrine would “lead prison administrators to
devise procedural requirements that are designed to trap unwary prisoners”
and purposely defeat their claims.142 Ultimately, as a result of Woodford,
131. 532 U.S. 731 (2001).
132. 534 U.S. 516 (2002).
133. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 (holding that Congress mandates exhaustion regardless of
relief sought).
134. Id. at 741 n.6.
135. Id. at 741.
136. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 520.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 526–27.
139. 548 U.S. 81 (2006).
140. Id. at 84; see also Meredith Sterritt, Note, The Prison Litigation Reform Act & Ross
v. Blake: Why the Constitution Requires Amending the Exhaustion Requirement to Protect
Inmates’ Access to Federal Court, 53 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 115, 122 (2020).
141. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 103.
142. Id. at 102.
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even the most minor departure from a procedural requirement in a prison
grievance system can serve as the basis for dismissing a prisoner-plaintiff’s
claim before examining the merits.143
In 2016, the Court considered whether special circumstances can excuse
an inmate’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In Ross v. Blake,144
the Court rejected a special circumstances exception to the PLRA’s
exhaustion provision,145 while simultaneously identifying a textual exception
requiring an inmate to exhaust only administrative remedies that are
“available.”146 It emphasized that a grievance process would be practically
unavailable: (1) where it “operates as a simple dead end—with officers
unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates”;
(2) where it is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of
use”; or (3) where prison administrators prevent access to it “through
machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.”147 The Court, however,
left lower courts to engage in fact-specific inquiries over whether
administrative remedies were “available” in certain instances.148
Most recently, however, the Court revisited the issue of PLRA exhaustion
in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite affirming the denial of
an application to vacate a stay on an injunction requiring a state geriatric
prison to follow an extensive protocol to prevent the spread of the
coronavirus, Justice Sotomayor explained that “if a plaintiff has established
that the prison grievance procedures at issue are utterly incapable of
responding to a rapidly spreading pandemic like Covid-19, the procedures
may be ‘unavailable’ to meet the plaintiff’s purposes.”149 She reasoned that,
in “unprecedented circumstances,” the PLRA’s textual exception of
“availability” formally introduced in Ross v. Blake could “open the
courthouse doors where they would otherwise stay closed.”150
Despite Justice Sotomayor’s implicit signal to lower courts to utilize the
exhaustion requirement’s lone textual exception for claims arising during and
related to the pandemic, some courts have still refused to find that a prison’s

143. As a procedural matter, an inmate’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies under
the PLRA is an affirmative defense and inmates are not required to specially plead or
demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007).
However, some federal district courts have inmates file pro forma complaints that include
questions asking if they have exhausted their administrative remedies, thus requiring them to
allege exhaustion in many instances. See Broc Gullett, Comment, Eliminating Standard
Pleading Forms That Require Prisoners to Allege Their Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1179, 1199.
144. 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016).
145. Id. at 1858.
146. See id. (explaining the textual exception to the PLRA’s mandatory exhaustion
provision). As used in the PLRA, “available” means capable of use to obtain some relief for
the action complained of. See id. at 1859 (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738
(2001)).
147. Id. at 1859–60.
148. See id. at 1859.
149. Valentine v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 1598, 1600–01 (2020) (mem.).
150. Id. at 1601.
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grievance process is unavailable.151 For example, the Fifth Circuit bluntly
concluded that “under Ross, special circumstances—even threats posed by
global pandemics—do not matter” for the purpose of PLRA exhaustion.152
In holding that two geriatric inmates had failed to exhaust their prison’s
grievance system prior to bringing suit, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that
“inadequate is not a synonym for unavailable.”153 Despite acknowledging
that the prison’s grievance process was “suboptimal,” in that it was “lengthy
and unlikely to provide necessary COVID-19 relief,” the Fifth Circuit
nevertheless found the process to be “available.”154
In the midst of a pandemic posing unique dangers to people in prison,155
courts have continued to strictly interpret the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement which, by its unambiguous terms, “prevent[s] a court from
deciding that exhaustion would be unjust or inappropriate in a given case.”156
Thus, all inmates—regardless of the merits of their claims or the
unprecedented circumstances in which they find themselves—are required to
exhaust all available remedies before accessing the court system.
b. Navigating Increasingly Complex Grievance Procedures
Strict application of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement and the
court-made doctrine of “proper exhaustion” makes grievance procedures a
critical element in the protection of prisoners’ constitutional rights.157
However, successfully completing all stages of a prison’s grievance process
may prove difficult for many inmates. Without an attorney, many inmates158
often struggle to master the intricate details of a grievance procedure.159 The
practical administration of a typical grievance system also poses serious
challenges.160 In states where a grievance procedure is not subject to
notice-and-comment rulemaking, a prisoner is required to “complain[] about
the actions of prison staff to prison staff using rules administered and often
written by prison staff and corrections officials.”161 Accordingly, corrections
staff have an interest in making it hard for prisoners to successfully exhaust
151. See generally, e.g., Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 2020); Nellson v.
Barnhart, No. 20-cv-00756, 2020 WL 6204275 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2020).
152. Valentine, 978 F.3d at 161.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 162.
155. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
156. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016).
157. Borchardt, supra note 112, at 490.
158. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
159. See Schlanger, supra note 55, at 592–93 (“The exhaustion rule establishes an
extremely difficult hurdle for many of the inmates who bring damage actions, usually without
counsel, because they are frequently unable to navigate cumbersome and confusing grievance
procedures.”).
160. A typical grievance procedure does not have an external entity to the prison agency
overseeing the grievance system. See Deitch, supra note 38, at 1767–72 (listing only a few
states that have an independent ombudsperson who investigates prisoners’ grievances).
161. Alison M. Mikkor, Correcting for Bias and Blind Spots in PLRA Exhaustion Law, 21
GEO. MASON L. REV. 573, 579 (2014).
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administrative remedies, as the ability to properly exhaust directly impacts
the viability of a future lawsuit that could hold those same individuals
liable.162
Moreover, inmates’ fear of retaliation can deter them from participating in
the grievance process altogether, despite having a potentially meritorious
complaint.163 As the typical first step of a prison grievance procedure is to
seek an informal resolution by confronting the officer or staff member
involved, the system can naturally facilitate these fears.164 According to
Professor James E. Robertson, retaliation against inmates is an unfortunate
norm.165 Studies have shown that large percentages of people in prison have
experienced retaliation as a result of submitting a grievance.166 Thus, despite
having legitimate complaints regarding their conditions of confinement,
many inmates may choose to not file grievances at all.167 Because of PLRA
exhaustion, these inmates who abstain from filing grievances may ultimately
sacrifice the ability to bring their underlying complaint to federal court,
meaning that their experiences will remain behind bars.168
In addition to these difficulties, there is also evidence that some states have
reconfigured their grievance processes to have “increasingly onerous, rigid
requirements, or otherwise maintain[ed] grievance systems designed to foil
prisoners’ lawsuits.”169 For example, one study found the evolution of
Arkansas’s grievance procedure to exhibit a troubling pattern. From 1997 to
2011, the difficulty of the Arkansas DOC’s grievance procedure was
“incrementally raised, and revisions were added to specifically target and
162. See id. at 581.
163. See James E. Robertson, “One of the Dirty Secrets of American Corrections”:
Retaliation, Surplus Power, and Whistleblowing Inmates, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 611, 614
(2009).
164. See Borchardt, supra note 112, at 493 n.130 (citing to several state grievance policies
that require informal resolution involving a discussion or dialogue with prison staff as the first
step).
165. Robertson, supra note 163, at 613.
166. See e.g., PRISON JUST. LEAGUE, A “RIGGED SYSTEM”: HOW THE TEXAS GRIEVANCE
SYSTEM FAILS PRISONERS AND THE PUBLIC 5 (2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
scans/prison_justice_league/a_rigged_system.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GQK-WPHK] (finding
that 85.45 percent of prisoners surveyed in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice reported
some form of staff retaliation for using the grievance system); Robertson, supra note 163, at
613–14 (describing a survey of Ohio inmates that found that 70.1 percent of inmates who
brought grievances suffered retaliation as a result and a New York State study with
comparable results).
167. See Robertson, supra note 163, at 614 (summarizing a study finding that 60 percent
of the prison supervisors surveyed responded that a substantial number of inmates do not file
grievances despite having legitimate complaints, in part, because of the fear of retaliation).
168. See id.
169. Borchardt, supra note 112, at 472. Providing a detailed account of the myriad of ways
in which some states have changed their grievance procedures is outside the scope of this
Note. This Note makes the general point that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement has
provided state DOCs with incentives to erect higher barriers to court and that some states have,
in fact, acted accordingly. For an in-depth study of the precise changes made by several states
to their grievance procedures, see id. at 490–519; see also Mikkor, supra note 161, at 583
(describing how several state corrections agencies made changes to their internal grievance
procedures after the PLRA’s enactment).
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defeat arguments that prisoners had previously used to convince courts that
they adequately exhausted the available procedures.”170 In addition to
imposing shorter time limits to appeal a grievance decision,171 revisions
included a requirement that an inmate exhaust remedies through the
grievance process in instances where officers have retaliated against the same
inmate for filing a grievance in the first place,172 as well as a strict
requirement to identify all relevant personnel on a grievance form.173
Under the proper exhaustion standard set out in Woodford, elaborate
grievance procedures, such as the one described, become traps for the
unwary.174 Since Woodford, thousands of prisoner civil rights cases have
been dismissed for failure to properly exhaust administrative remedies,
without regard for the merits of the claims.175 In a report criticizing the
PLRA and calling for amendment to the Act, Human Rights Watch illustrated
how district courts have frequently dismissed cases because inmates have
made technical errors, used the wrong form, or wrote to the wrong entity
within the prison system, thus not properly following a prison’s internal
grievance process.176 Even when there is good cause for an inmate’s failure
to comply with a prison’s grievance system—such as dyslexia, illiteracy,
mental illness, brain injury and memory loss, blindness, or being in a coma—
courts have continued to enforce the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.177
This has even continued during the COVID-19 pandemic,178 making clear
that courts are not departing from a strictly textual interpretation of the
exhaustion requirement, even when faced with otherwise meritorious civil
rights claims. In this way, the exhaustion requirement obstructs meritorious
civil rights lawsuits.
2. The Filing Fee Provision
The PLRA’s filing fee provision requires all inmate litigants challenging
the conditions of their confinement to pay court filing fees in full.179 When
describing its rationale for the filing fee requirement, Congress stated that all

170. Borchardt, supra note 112, at 502.
171. See id. at 506.
172. See id. at 507–08 (stating how the procedures were updated to eliminate the possibility
of a prisoner immediately filing a lawsuit in federal court after being retaliated against by
providing that “[i]f an inmate believes he/she has been retaliated against for the use of the
grievance procedure, he/she must . . . exhaust their [sic] remedies through the grievance
process” (alterations in original) (quoting Dep’t of Corr., State of Ark., Administrative
Directive 04-01 § IV.K.1 (2004))).
173. See id. at 505 (quoting the Dep’t of Corr., State of Ark., Administrative Directive
07-03 § IV.C.4 (2007)).
174. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM
ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2009), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
us0609web.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3S8-VX7W].
175. Honick, supra note 62, at 180.
176. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 174, at 15.
177. See id. at 16.
178. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
179. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
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it was doing was “asking [inmates to] pay the same kind of filing fees and
costs” as all other citizens bringing lawsuits.180
Although perhaps an appropriate measure181—both to ensure proper
funding of the court system and to create a financial disincentive for
would-be inmate litigants filing frivolous complaints—the filing fee
provision imposes a considerable financial burden on inmate litigants, who
overwhelmingly proceed as indigent plaintiffs.182
Generally, indigent plaintiffs who cannot afford to pay court filing fees
and costs may request in forma pauperis status and ask a court to waive the
requisite fees.183 Prior to the PLRA, the same was true for indigent inmate
litigants.184 But pursuant to the PLRA, inmates can no longer have fees
waived.185 If an inmate qualifies as in forma pauperis,186 the full filing fee
still must be paid, but the payment can be completed in installments.187
Denying indigent inmate litigants the ability to waive court filing fees can
deter them from filing meritorious claims. For example, the current amount
for an initial filing fee in federal court is $350.188 This can amount to
“months, if not years, of prison wages.”189 While there may be less of a need
for an income in prison, the money an inmate earns or receives from the state
180. 141 CONG. REC. 27,044 (1995).
181. See Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1695 (“Inmates, like most other litigants, can
appropriately be asked to bear some of the costs of their litigation.”).
182. See Free v. United States, 879 F.2d 1535, 1539 (7th Cir. 1989) (Coffey, J., concurring)
(“[T]he vast majority of prisoners are indigent, necessitating the filing of their complaints in
forma pauperis . . . .”).
183. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(2).
184. See Green v. Young, 454 F.3d 405, 407 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Prior to the enactment of the
PLRA, prisoners were able to use the in forma pauperis statute to avoid paying filing fees.”);
see also Tasha Hill, Comment, Inmates’ Need for Federally Funded Lawyers: How the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, Casey, and Iqbal Combine with Implicit Bias to Eviscerate Inmate Civil
Rights, 62 UCLA L. REV. 176, 202 (2015); Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1607; Mallory Yontz,
Comment, Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act: Imposing Financial Burdens on
Prisoners over Tax Payers, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1061, 1069 (2011).
185. Hill, supra note 184, at 202.
186. To request in forma pauperis status, a prisoner must submit “an affidavit that includes
a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses” and “a certified copy of the trust fund account
statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month period immediately
preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
187. See id. § 1915(b)(1)–(2). The inmate litigant must pay, at the time of filing and each
month thereafter until the filing fee is paid off, 20 percent of the greater of (1) the amount of
money in the inmate’s prison account or (2) the average of funds in the inmate’s prison account
for the preceding six months. Id. If an inmate is ultimately incapable of paying even the initial
partial payment, he will not be prohibited from bringing the civil action but will still be
required to pay off the requisite amount in monthly installments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4).
188. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (“The clerk of each district court shall require the parties
instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in such court . . . to pay a filing fee of
$350 . . . .”).
189. Brief Amici Curiae of Thirty-Three Professors in Support of Petitioner, Coleman v.
Tollefson at 19, 135 S. Ct. 1759 (2015) (No. 13-1333), 2014 WL 7205509, at *19. The
average hourly wage for people working in state prisons ranges anywhere from approximately
fourteen cents to less than two dollars per hour. See Wendy Sawyer, How Much Do
Incarcerated People Earn in Each State?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/ [https://perma.cc/Y584-JH2E].
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is often used to satisfy fees and inflated commissary costs of items, such as
extra food, hygiene supplies, postage and writing supplies, phone calls, and
other essential goods and services.190 Per the PLRA, “[n]o matter how poor
an inmate is, or how essential the items she must buy from the commissary
with her meager funds, monthly payments of 20 percent of her inmate
account must be handed over until the court fees are paid in full.”191 The
PLRA’s filing fee thus pushes indigent inmates to weigh their options:
pursuing a civil rights claim—likely lessening the ability to purchase goods
and services from the commissary—or abstaining from filing a civil rights
complaint to have fewer struggles in prison.192 Therefore, even when cases
may be high in merit, the filing fee requirement discourages prisoners from
filing a civil rights lawsuit in the first place.
3. The “Three-Strikes” Rule
The PLRA removes the ability to pay filing fees through monthly
installments for those deemed to be frequent filers through the “three-strikes”
rule. The three-strikes rule prohibits people in prison from filing in forma
pauperis if:
the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or
detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United
States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner
is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.193

Accordingly, a prisoner who has received three strikes must almost always
pay the entire court filing fee up front before proceeding.194 If a court
determines that a prisoner-plaintiff has three strikes, it can allow thirty days
for the full filing fee to be paid. If this is not done, the action will be
dismissed.195 Barring a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis is the
practical equivalent of barring a prisoner from court altogether.196 Most

190. Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1646; see also, e.g., Hill, supra note 184, at 195 n.114
(noting that in Illinois state prisons, inmates without jobs receive $9.60 from the state each
month, which can be fully spent on health care co-pays, extra shampoo or toothpaste, and extra
clothing).
191. Hill, supra note 184, at 202–03.
192. See id. at 203 n.185 (“If an inmate should be lucky enough to have a job, at the average
wage of a few dollars a day, if she spends no money on food, toiletries, or any other essentials,
she could pay [sic] filing fee in roughly six and a half months.”).
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
194. See Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1723 (2020).
195. See, e.g., McFadden v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 270 F. Supp. 3d 82, 87–90 (D.D.C. 2017)
(explaining that where a prisoner with three strikes does not fall within the imminent danger
exception, the “better procedure” is to revoke in forma pauperis status, order payment of the
full filing fee within thirty days, and dismiss the action without prejudice if the prisoner failed
to pay within that time frame (quoting Matthews v. FBI, 251 F. Supp. 3d 257, 264 (D.D.C.
2017))).
196. Molly Guptill Manning, Trouble Counting to Three: Circuit Splits and Confusion in
Interpreting the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s ‘Three Strikes Rule,’ 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), 28
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 207, 213–14 (2018).
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importantly, the three-strikes rule—just like the exhaustion and filing fee
provisions—applies equally to frivolous and meritorious claims.
Nevertheless, courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of the
PLRA’s “three-strikes” rule.197 Courts have rejected equal protection
challenges, asserting that the rule is rationally related to a legitimate
government interest in “relieving the pressure of excessive prisoner filings”
on federal courts by introducing economic disincentives to filing frivolous
lawsuits.198 Moreover, in holding that the rule does not violate an inmate’s
right to access to the courts, the Second Circuit explained that the provision
affects merely an inmate’s “ability to proceed in forma pauperis after
repeated filings reaching a level that Congress has deemed abusive” and does
not prevent inmates from filing civil actions altogether.199
However, in reality, the three-strikes rule has not been limited to instances
of abusive, repeated frivolous filings.200 The statute does not define the terms
“frivolous,” “malicious,” or “fails to state a claim,” thus leaving courts to
evaluate whether to count a prior dismissal of an inmate’s lawsuit as a
strike.201 However, in a concise opinion, the Supreme Court recently held
that a dismissal for failure to state a claim counts as a strike, whether or not
it was with prejudice.202 Treating a dismissal for failure to state a claim as a
strike can serve to effectively punish a pro se inmate litigant for an
understandable inability to artfully draft a complaint sufficient to survive
heightened federal pleading standards.203 Regardless of whether prior
dismissals were based on insufficiencies in pleading, procedural mistakes, or
even frivolous claims, once an inmate has accumulated three strikes, the

197. See, e.g., Carolina v. Rubino, 644 F. App’x 68, 71 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that the
PLRA three-strikes rule does not violate an inmate’s First Amendment right to access to the
courts); Higgins v. Carpenter, 258 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the three-strikes
rule was rationally related to a legitimate government interest in curtailing meritless inmate
suits); Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that the PLRA’s
three-strikes rule does not violate due process or the Fifth Amendment equal protection rights
of prisoners).
198. Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1997). Prior to the PLRA, Congress
recognized that “a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike
a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or
repetitive lawsuits.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
199. Rubino, 644 F. App’x at 71.
200. See Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1695 (noting how “[t]he PLRA’s frequent filer
provision is far, far broader than th[e] quite limited problem” of abusive inmate filings).
201. See Manning, supra note 196, at 215. An order granting summary judgment in favor
of a defendant does not typically count as a PLRA strike. Richard H. Frankel & Alistair E.
Newbern, Prisoners and Pleading, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 899, 923 (2017).
202. Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1727 (2020).
203. See Hill, supra note 184, at 183, 210 (explaining how the Supreme Court decisions in
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal have created a heightened federal pleading
standard that is extremely difficult for pro se inmate plaintiffs to overcome). Although judges
are supposed to read pro se complaints liberally and apply less stringent standards than papers
drafted by counsel, it does not appear that judges often do so. See id. at 212; see also Eisenberg,
supra note 61, at 443 (referencing a commentator who, upon review of reported district court
and court of appeals decisions, “found that a significant number of courts have applied
stringent pleading standards to pro se plaintiffs”).
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statute is strictly applied, thus preventing the filing of even meritorious
claims unless a prisoner can pay a relatively significant sum of money.204
Because the three-strikes rule has no time limit, if a prisoner obtains three
strikes early in a sentence or over a short span of time, a prisoner will be
forever barred from seeking federal court relief for any nonphysical harm,
unless the prisoner has sufficient funds to pay a $350 filing fee and related
costs.205 In a dissenting opinion, a Third Circuit judge acknowledged that
some prisoners “whose ‘strikes’ were racked up without any bad faith or
abuse” subsequently face § 1915(g)’s bar of even “potentially meritorious
litigation at the filing stage, with no opportunity for substantive review or
appeal.”206 Despite PLRA proponents’ promise that the Act would not
prevent the filing of meritorious suits, the three-strikes rule continues to
break this promise.
4. Limitations on Attorney’s Fees
The PLRA’s provisions limiting attorney’s fee awards specifically target
only successful, meritorious cases.207 The PLRA limits the scope and
amount of attorneys’ compensation for prisoners’ civil rights claims that
would otherwise be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.208 The limitations
function in the following ways.209 Attorney’s fees cannot be an hourly rate
greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964210 for payment of court-appointed costs.211 In addition,
in damages cases, attorney’s fees cannot be greater than 150 percent of the

204. Although the statute provides that an indigent inmate will not have to pay the filing
fee up front when facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury,” this exception has been
reasonably understood to serve its role “as an escape hatch for genuine emergencies only.”
Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002).
205. See Manning, supra note 196, at 238.
206. Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 320 (3d Cir. 2001) (Mansmann, J.,
dissenting).
207. Hill, supra note 184, at 204 (explaining how the PLRA’s rules “limit attorney
compensation for successful constitutional claims”).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d); see Eleanor Umphres, Note, 150% Wrong: The Prison
Litigation Reform Act and Attorney’s Fees, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 261, 264 (2019) (discussing
how the PLRA “strikes a damning blow” by restricting attorney compensation otherwise
authorized by the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, which is commonly
referred to as § 1988). For a comprehensive description of attorney’s fee awards under the
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, see Karen M. Klotz, The Price of Civil Rights: The
Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Attorney’s Fee-Cap Provision as a Violation of Equal
Protection of the Laws, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 759, 764–66 (2000).
209. In order for attorney’s fees to be awarded, they must have been “directly and
reasonably incurred” in proving a civil rights violation, and the amount of the fee must be
“proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation” or “directly and
reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.”
42 U.S.C. §§ 1997e(d)(1)(A), (B)(i)–(ii).
210. Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C § 3006A).
211. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3); see also Hill, supra note 184, at 204.
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plaintiff’s monetary recovery.212 Courts are also instructed to require a
portion of an inmate plaintiff’s money judgment, not exceeding 25 percent,
to be deducted to satisfy an attorney’s fee award.213
This section explains how these limitations exacerbate the preexisting
difficulties for inmates in obtaining legal counsel and emphasizes how the
PLRA’s limitations on attorney’s fees further diminish an inmate’s chances
of succeeding on a meritorious claim.
a. The Difficulties in Obtaining Counsel
Even before the PLRA, inmates have always had considerable difficulty
obtaining counsel in civil rights cases.214 While there is a constitutional right
to counsel for defendants in criminal cases,215 there is no such parallel right
in civil cases.216 Nor is there typically a statutory right to counsel.217 If an
inmate attempts to seek counsel prior to filing a lawsuit, finding private
attorneys willing to provide legal services in a prisoner’s civil rights case is
rather difficult.218 First, prisoners have no suitable way of identifying and
connecting with the small percentage of lawyers who are actually willing to
take on their cases before a complaint is filed.219 Second, because prisons
are often located in remote, rural areas, attorneys may be unwilling to make
a “300 mile trip” to participate in client interviews and provide in-person
counseling.220 Lastly, both the “deep-seated societal antipathy towards
prisoners as a class as well as the absence of lost wages or future earnings
damages ensures that damages in prisoner cases will nearly always be
minimal.”221 The high costs of conducting effective discovery and retaining

212. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2); see also Hill, supra note 184, at 204; see also Umphres,
supra note 208, at 264 (arguing that for decades courts have erroneously construed the
language of § 1997e(d)(2) to cap attorney’s fees at 150 percent of the monetary award).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2); Klotz, supra note 208, at 769.
214. See Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1613 (explaining that before the PLRA, inmates’
cases were less attractive to lawyers).
215. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (establishing a criminal
defendant’s right to counsel).
216. See Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 446.
217. See id. at 448.
218. See id. at 463 (“There are virtually no lawyers in the United States who solicit prisoner
civil rights litigation in the hope of earning fees through such representation.”); see also Sarah
B. Schnorrenberg, Note, Mandating Justice: Naranjo v. Thompson as a Solution for Unequal
Access to Representation, 50 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 260, 283 (2019) (noting how limits
on sending mail and accessing telephones and on the number of lawyers with whom they can
keep confidential contact make the odds that inmates will contact and convince an attorney to
willingly take on their cases extremely low).
219. See Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 463 n.216.
220. Id. See generally Lisa R. Pruitt & Bradley E. Showman, Law Stretched Thin: Access
to Justice in Rural America, 59 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2014) (emphasizing the serious lack of
adequate legal services in rural America, particularly to low-income individuals).
221. Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 606 (7th Cr. 2003) (Rovner, J., dissenting); see also
Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1622–23 (explaining that, under ordinary rules of tort damages,
because injured inmates who remain incarcerated after injury suffer little or no lost wages and
no medical expenses, damages remain low even in cases involving serious injury).
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expert assistance can exceed expected damages,222 making litigating a
prisoner’s civil rights case not economically feasible. Thus, even if more
attorneys were willing to provide representation for prisoners in civil rights
case, they may be unable to do so.
Nonetheless, there remains a handful of legal services organizations that
aid prisoners in civil rights cases pro bono.223 Nonprofit organizations that
litigate prisoners’ civil rights lawsuits include the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU)224—at both national and state levels—as well as different
state organizations, such as Prisoners’ Legal Services of New York (PLS).225
While national organizations tend to take on large class actions or impact
litigation,226 regional, state, and local organizations tend to focus on
representing individual inmates.227 However, the decision to assist with any
particular case “depends on the issue or problem presented, the chance of
success, the amount of time and resources necessary to properly assist, the
office’s resources, staff availability and caseload.”228 As such, legal aid
organizations can only offer a limited amount of representation.229 While all
of these organizations can aid in some cases, there remains a large gap in
representation, as demand typically overwhelms the supply of available pro
bono assistance.230

222. See Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 488–89.
223. See
Legal
Resource
Database,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/resources/legal/ [https://perma.cc/M4HQ-U5NK] (last visited
Aug. 9, 2021) (listing a database of law firms and organizations that provide free legal
assistance to incarcerated people on civil matters).
224. See About the ACLU National Prison Project, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/
other/about-aclu-national-prison-project [https://perma.cc/F5NZ-WZMS] (last visited Aug. 9,
2021) (explaining how the ACLU National Prison Project is the only program that litigates
prison conditions cases on a national level).
225. PRISONERS’ LEGAL SERVS. OF N.Y., https://www.plsny.org [https://perma.cc/7JCGC8F9] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021) (indicating that PLS provides legal representation to
incarcerated New Yorkers).
226. See Susan P. Sturm, Lawyers at the Prison Gates: Organizational Structure and
Corrections Advocacy, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 23 (1993) (describing how two national
organizations concentrate on class-action litigation challenging widespread systemic
problems).
227. See id. at 37 (describing how numerous states and the District of Columbia have
programs providing legal representation to prison inmates in individual cases).
228. Legal Resources for People in Prison in New York, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/resources/legal/NY/ [https://perma.cc/2S4Q-MW9U] (last
visited Aug. 9, 2021).
229. In 2018, Prisoner Legal Services of New York received over 10,000 requests for
assistance from incarcerated New Yorkers but, due to limited resources, was only able to
accept and investigate approximately 2000, or 20 percent, of those requests. KAREN L.
MURTAGH & THOMAS J. CURRAN, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE HEARINGS ON
THE NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC PROTECTION BUDGET FOR FY2019–2020 CONDUCTED BY THE
ASSEMBLY WAYS AND MEANS AND SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEES 3 (2019),
https://www.nysenate.gov/sites/default/files/testimony_given_by_the_prisoners_legal_servic
es_pls.pdf [https://perma.cc/FP6L-JFUD].
230. See Hill, supra note 184, at 226.
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Therefore, in the vast majority of situations, a prisoner has no choice but
to proceed pro se.231 Only after a complaint is drafted and the case is filed
may an indigent inmate litigant move to appoint counsel under 28 U.S.C.
Typically, district courts appoint counsel only in
§ 1915(e)(1).232
exceptional cases where the claims have sufficient merit or involve complex
or novel legal questions and where the indigent litigant cannot adequately
present his case and has made unsuccessful efforts to obtain a lawyer.233
Court appointment is typically the primary means of involving private law
firms who volunteer to take on pro bono matters in prisoners’ civil rights
cases.234
However, because the motion to appoint counsel occurs after an inmate
plaintiff is supposed to have exhausted administrative remedies and drafted
a complaint, the motion is considered moot if a court finds that an inmate has
failed to satisfy any one of the PLRA’s procedural requirements or that the
complaint fails to state a claim.235 Thus, the decision to appoint counsel
occurs after an inmate would have already made errors resulting in
dismissal—errors that could have possibly been avoided if that inmate had
attorney representation from the initial filing of an internal grievance in
prison.236
Even once a court decides counsel is appropriate in a given case, it can
often do no more than merely request such representation.237 Thus, an
attorney must voluntarily accept a court appointment for a prisoner’s case
free of charge.238

231. See Tiffany Buxton, Note, Foreign Solutions to the U.S. Pro Se Phenomenon, 34 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 103, 105 (2002) (explaining, with respect to the general population, that
“[t]he prohibitive cost of obtaining counsel remains the primary reason for the increased
number of litigants appearing pro se”); see also Free v. United States, 879 F.2d 1535, 1539
(7th Cir. 1989) (Coffey, J., concurring) (“[T]he vast majority of prisoners are indigent,
necessitating the filing of their complaints in forma pauperis . . . .”).
232. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (providing that a court “may request an attorney to
represent any person unable to afford counsel”).
233. See generally John R. FitzGerald, Note, Non-Merit-Based Tests Have No Merit:
Restoring District Court Discretion Under § 1915(E)(1), 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2169
(2018) (highlighting a circuit split in which the majority of circuits allow district judges to
consider the case’s merits before appointing counsel under § 1915(e)(1)).
234. See Sturm, supra note 226, at 105.
235. See, e.g., Gaither v. Deal, CV 120-094, 2020 WL 5736612, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 4,
2020) (denying indigent inmate’s motions for appointment of counsel as moot because the
inmate had at least three strikes and did not qualify for the imminent danger exception under
the PLRA).
236. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 184, at 194 n.108 (explaining how the Central District of
California appoints counsel only if the case has survived dismissal and summary judgment,
unless an inmate has severe mental or language-related challenges).
237. See Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1612 (noting that counsel appointments have been
quite rare since courts can neither compel attorneys to serve as counsel nor compensate them
for their service). But see Schnorrenberg, supra note 218, at 265 (highlighting how the Fifth
Circuit became the first circuit to find that courts can compel representation via inherent
authority).
238. See Hill, supra note 184, at 195.
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b. A Chilling Effect: Attorney’s Fee Limitations Discourage
Representation
The PLRA’s attorney’s fee limitations exacerbate these existing
difficulties in obtaining counsel and discourage attorney representation in
prisoner civil rights cases, particularly cases with merit. Despite expressing
concerns about how the PLRA’s limitations on attorney’s fees may
disincentivize attorneys from representing prisoners in civil rights cases,
courts have rejected constitutional challenges.239 For example, in Walker v.
Bain,240 the Sixth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the PLRA’s attorney
fee caps241 despite noting that § 1997e(d)(2) “will have a strong chilling
effect upon counsels’ willingness to represent prisoners who have
meritorious claims” and admitting “to being troubled by a federal statute that
seeks to reduce the number of meritorious civil rights claims and protect the
public fisc at the expense of denying a politically unpopular group their
ability to vindicate actual . . . civil rights violations.”242
This “chilling effect” is best illustrated in how courts have applied the fee
limitations in cases where a prisoner-plaintiff is awarded minimal or nominal
damages.243 Courts have repeatedly rejected an exception to § 1997e(d)(2)
for minimal or nominal monetary judgments.244 Thus, lawyers who
represent prisoners in civil rights cases resulting in low damage awards are
sometimes left with a fee award of just $1.50 for years of work.245 The
Second Circuit acknowledged that capping attorney’s fees for a $1.00
monetary judgment at $1.50 is the “practical equivalent of no fee award at
all.”246 Consequently, private attorneys have even less of an incentive to take
on prisoner’s rights cases than they had before.247

239. See, e.g., Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 669 (6th Cir. 2001) (“§ 1997e(d)(2) is
rationally related to serving the purposes of decreasing marginal prisoner lawsuits and
protecting the public fisc.”); Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that
§ 1997e(d)(2) does not offend the Fifth Amendment); Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 996
(9th Cir. 1999).
240. 257 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2001).
241. Id. at 670 (holding that § 1997e(d)(2) survived rational basis review).
242. Id.
243. It is common for money damages in successful inmate civil rights cases finding
constitutional violations to be of low or nominal value, unless violations are accompanied by
serious bodily harm or dehumanizing treatment. See Robert L. Tsai, Conceptualizing
Constitutional Litigation as Anti-Government Expression: A Speech-Centered Theory of
Court Access, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 835, 895 (2002).
244. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Goord, 662 F.3d 603, 609 (2d Cir. 2011); Keup v. Hopkins, 596
F.3d 899, 905–06 (8th Cir. 2010); Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 742 (7th Cir. 2006);
Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006); Boivin, 225 F.3d at 40.
245. See supra note 244; see also Umphres, supra note 208, at 271.
246. Shepherd, 662 F.3d at 609.
247. See Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 369 n.2 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“An attorney’s decision to invest time and energy in a civil rights suit
necessarily involves a complex balance of factors, including the likelihood of success, the
amount of labor necessary to prosecute the case to completion, and the potential recovery.”);
Tsai, supra note 243, at 895 (explaining how the PLRA’s attorney’s fee caps further
disincentivize lawyers from representing inmates).
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This added disincentive negatively affects not the frivolous cases that
Congress intended to target but the meritorious lawsuits that it claimed would
not be disturbed.248 As a result, the PLRA’s attorney’s fee limitations further
complicate the ability of an inmate to adequately present a meritorious claim
to the court, as cases with attorney representation are much more successful
than those without.249
C. The Post-PLRA Aftermath
Overall, the PLRA’s impact on individual inmate cases was immediate and
profound, particularly with respect to the number of new civil rights
complaints filed in federal court. In the first five years following the PLRA’s
enactment, there was a 43 percent decline in new federal filings despite a
simultaneous 23 percent increase in the incarcerated population.250 By 2006,
the number of inmate filings per 1000 inmates had decreased by 60 percent
since 1995.251 Filing rates then stabilized between 2007 and 2018.252
It is difficult to know for certain whether the sharp decline in new federal
filings reflected a decline in frivolous or meritorious lawsuits.253 According
to Professors Margo Schlanger and Giovanna Shay, these trends suggest that
the PLRA has fulfilled its stated purpose of lightening the burdens imposed
on state governments and courts by frivolous prisoner litigation.254 But
meritorious lawsuits have become collateral damage, suggesting that the
decline in filings reflects, at least in part, a decline in filings that may have
otherwise had some merit.
If the PLRA only targeted frivolous lawsuits, thus allowing for meritorious
claims to shine through, one would expect to see prisoner-plaintiffs
succeeding in more lawsuits than before.255 Yet, as fewer inmates are
248. See Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 601 (7th Cir. 2003) (Rovner, J., dissenting)
(predicting that the only impact the PLRA’s attorney’s fee provisions will have is on the
meritorious prisoner actions).
249. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
250. Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1559–60.
251. Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails
and Prisons: The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 139, 141–42 (2008).
252. Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153, 156 (2015). Recently updated data shows how filing rates have
slightly increased between 2012 and 2018, with a slight uptick of approximately 2 percent.
Data Update: Table A: Incarcerated Population and Prison/Jail Civil Rights/Conditions
Filings, FY 1970–FY 2020, INCARCERATION & THE L., https://incarcerationlaw.com/
resources/data-update/#TableA [https://perma.cc/4NUQ-BFYQ] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021);
see also Andrea Fenster & Margo Schlanger, Slamming the Courthouse Door: 25 Years of
Evidence for Repealing the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Apr. 26,
2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/PLRA_25.html [https://perma.cc/RQ7B-XRFE].
253. See Brian J. Ostrom et al., Congress, Courts and Corrections: An Empirical
Perspective on the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1525, 1544 (2003)
(“The precise nature of the cases not filed because of the PLRA’s provisions (meritorious vs.
nonmeritorious) is unknowable.”).
254. See Schlanger & Shay, supra note 251, at 141.
255. Id. at 142; see also 141 CONG. REC. 27,042 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“The
crushing burden of these frivolous suits makes it difficult for the courts to consider meritorious
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accessing the courts, even more cases are dismissed pretrial.256 Not only are
more cases dismissed, but they are dismissed at a faster rate than nonprisoner
civil rights cases.257
In addition to the decline in filings and increase in dismissal rates, there
was also a noticeable increase in the percentage of inmate civil rights cases
no longer represented by counsel. This suggests that the PLRA’s attorney’s
fee limitations had the chilling effect previously described. In 1996, prisoner
civil rights cases proceeded without counsel 83.3 percent of the time.258 By
2000, that number jumped to 95.6 percent and remained relatively high,
staying at 92.4 percent in 2020.259
While the PLRA governs prisoners’ lawsuits challenging prison conditions
in federal court, state prisoners theoretically have the option of bringing state
claims in state court.260 However, after the PLRA’s passage, many state
legislatures enacted analogous statutes restricting inmate access to state
court261 if they had not done so already.262 Thus, at both the federal and state
levels, courthouse doors remain largely closed to people in prison.
These post-PLRA trends indicate that the PLRA has disrupted the ability
of litigation to serve its traditional role as a viable transparency mechanism
for the prison population.263 In deterring and obstructing the filing of
meritorious prisoner civil rights claims, the PLRA has constructed yet
another barrier between prisons and the public264—one that does not appear
ready to break down anytime soon.

claims.”); 141 CONG. REC. 38,276 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“If we achieve a 50-percent
reduction in bogus Federal prisoner claims, we will free up judicial resources for claims with
merit by . . . prisoners . . . .”).
256. See Hill, supra note 184, at 208.
257. See Schlanger, supra note 252, at 166, 166 tbl. 5.
258. Id. at 167 tbl. 6.
259. Data Update: Table B: Pro Se Litigation in U.S. District Courts, by Case Type,
INCARCERATION & THE L., https://incarcerationlaw.com/resources/data-update/#TableB
[https://perma.cc/RM8Y-E343] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
260. See Alison Brill, Note, Rights Without Remedy: The Myth of State Court Accessibility
After the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 645, 676 (2008).
261. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-12-1 to 42-12-9 (West 2021); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15:1181–90 (West 2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5501–600.5531 (West 2020);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6601–08 (West 2021); see also Lynn S. Branham, Of Mice and
Prisoners: The Constitutionality of Extending Prisoners’ Confinement for Filing Frivolous
Lawsuits, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1029 (2002) (“The PLRA catalyzed the enactment of state
statutes designed to further curb prisoners filing frivolous lawsuits.”).
262. See Brill, supra note 260, at 676–77; Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1635 n.272 (listing
state statutes specifically regulating inmate access to state court). Similar to the federal
counterpart, these state versions typically “require inmates to exhaust administrative remedies,
pay mandatory filing fees, impose penalties for frivolous suits, and limit the terms of
prospective relief.” Brill, supra note 260, at 676–77.
263. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text; see also Stan Stojkovic, Prison
Oversight and Prison Leadership, 30 PACE L. REV. 1476, 1482 (2010) (contending that the
PLRA’s ultimate impact is that “prisons have become less transparent”).
264. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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III. COLLATERALLY ATTACKING THE PLRA’S APPLICATION TO
MERITORIOUS CIVIL LAWSUITS
The PLRA continues to deter and obstruct the filing of meritorious
prisoner civil lawsuits, thus sharply limiting litigation as one of the only
effective transparency mechanisms for people in America’s prisons. While
many have urged for the Act’s amendment or repeal, those efforts have yet
to come to fruition, at least with respect to the access provisions.265
Moreover, there is no indication that courts will depart from a strictly textual
reading of the statute,266 absent Congressional action, which also appears
unlikely. Little scholarship has addressed how to counteract the harmful
effects that the PLRA’s access provisions have caused, while still preserving
litigation as a crucial transparency mechanism—short of the Act’s
amendment, repeal, or judicial reinterpretation.267 This Note therefore aims
to fill that gap.
Given the reality that the PLRA is likely to remain intact, Part III.A argues
that there is a need to combat the PLRA’s application to meritorious prisoner
civil rights lawsuits. Part III.B proposes that states adopt a two-step
framework that can pave the way for more meritorious claims to make it to
court with greater chances of success.
A. The Need to Combat the PLRA’s Application to Meritorious Lawsuits
There is a critical need for states to take proactive steps to counteract the
PLRA’s negative effects on meritorious prisoner civil rights cases. As a
general matter, transparency remains one of the key features of a properly
functioning democratic society. Without transparency, people in prison, the
public, and even correctional staff suffer the consequences. First, without
unfettered access to the courts, people in prison typically have no other
effective means to voice legitimate complaints about prison conditions to the
external world, leaving them vulnerable to mistreatment and abuse.268 The
PLRA thus tampers with one of the most fundamental rights belonging to
people in prison.269
Second, while macro-level judicial oversight and large-scale prison reform
are undoubtedly crucial,270 the role of individual inmate lawsuits must not be
overlooked. Individual inmate lawsuits can often be reflective of larger
existing issues that affect all inmates, such as overcrowding, inadequate

265. See, e.g., Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2009, H.R. 4335, 111th Cong. (2009).
266. See, e.g., supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text.
267. See Deitch, supra note 23, at 236 (arguing that there is a “critical need for alternative
and effective forms of correctional oversight” in a post-PLRA world); Hill, supra note 184, at
227 (proposing that “an organization called Prison Lawyers be established in the Ninth Circuit
as a pilot program to provide attorney assistance for inmates in all civil rights claims”); KAUL
ET AL., supra note 114, at 3–4 (recommending how to make grievance policies more fair
because grievance policies serve a court gatekeeper function assigned by the PLRA).
268. See supra notes 22–42 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 66–73 and accompanying text.
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health care, and unsafe living conditions.271 Moreover, they can serve as an
early-warning system of problematic practices or conditions that may
become widespread absent deliberate correction.272 Even if claims may
ultimately be unsubstantiated, the claim itself can help officials identify
potentially bad actors.273 Without a steady flow of viable inmate civil rights
lawsuits, this early-warning system fails, leading to bigger problems down
the road.
Third, combatting the PLRA’s application to meritorious civil rights
lawsuits is in the public interest. With billions of taxpayer dollars pouring
into the operation of correctional facilities nationwide, the public has a right
to know what occurs behind prison walls.274 Recent events, most notably the
COVID-19 crisis, have sparked public attention to issues in prisons, as it has
become clear that what happens inside prisons can directly impact the public
health and safety of not only those physically incarcerated but also the public
at large.275 For all of these reasons, there is a need to ensure that prisoners
with meritorious claims can have their complaints heard in court.
B. A Framework for Combatting the PLRA’s Application to Meritorious
Lawsuits
States are best equipped to counteract the PLRA’s negative effects, as the
majority of incarcerated persons in the United States are housed in state
prisons276 and the administration of grievance procedures is determined by
state processes.277 This Note proposes that states follow a two-step
framework. First, as Part III.B.1 explains, states should conduct prison
grievance processes primarily via electronic means to ensure that all
grievances are stored in electronic databases. Second, as Part III.B.2
describes, states should require that outside legal aid organizations litigating
prisoner civil rights cases be given access to prisons’ electronic grievance
databases.
As a practical matter, this Note neither encourages a particular means of
adoption nor provides which specific organizations must have access, as it
recognizes that each state’s political makeup is different and that each state
has different local organizations that litigate prisoner civil rights cases. With
that said, states can implement this Note’s proposed framework through
271. See Sturm, supra note 226, at 12–13.
272. See Tom Robbins, New York State Prisons Take Steps to Track Complaints About
Guards, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/21/nyregion/newyork-state-prisons-take-steps-to-track-complaints-about-guards.html [https://perma.cc/ZN76M4ER] (discussing how the hundreds of lawsuits filed by New York state inmates could
function as an early-warning system of repetitive abusive conduct by state corrections
officers).
273. See id. (quoting Karen L. Murtagh, the executive director of Prisoners’ Legal Services
of New York, claiming that “[i]f you are serious about identifying bad actors, . . . you should
be tracking the cases that have been filed against them, substantiated or not”).
274. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
275. See Deitch, supra note 35, at 213.
276. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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legislation, administrative regulation by the state DOC, or gubernatorial
authority. This Note’s proposal is thus broadly envisioned to promote
practical adoption among numerous states. Moreover, this Note’s proposed
framework not only offers a practical means to collaterally attack the PLRA’s
application to meritorious prisoner lawsuits but also can spark a lively debate
over how to best navigate a post-PLRA reality.
1. Step One: Implementing Electronic Grievance Systems
States should ensure that prison grievance processes are conducted
primarily via electronic means to ensure that all grievances are then stored in
electronic databases. While some state prison systems have electronic data
systems to store information pertaining to grievances, those data systems
typically require manual entry by prison staff, who sometimes only log
grievances into the system if they are filled out correctly.278 In recent years,
however, several state prison systems have begun to make,279 or have made,
the transition from all paper forms by implementing kiosks or providing
electronic tablets made by private companies, such as JPAY.280 Having an
electronic means through which to submit, process, and track grievances also
allows states to further standardize the grievance process and simplify it as
much as possible.
In providing an electronic means to submit and track grievances which can
enable further standardization of forms, inmates may have a better chance of
satisfying the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. For inmates, the ability to
electronically submit a grievance can place greater confidence in the
grievance system, as inmates can fully control their submissions.281 Such a
system also benefits the staff overseeing the grievance process, as they no
278. See, e.g., Goodrick v. Field, No. 17-CV-265, 2020 WL 6371160, at *2 (D. Idaho Oct.
29, 2020). According to the Idaho DOC’s grievance system, upon receipt of a grievance form
from an inmate, the grievance coordinator enters the grievance information into the
“Corrections Integrated System,” which is an electronic database used to log offender
grievances and grievance appeals. Id. The grievance coordinator, however, only logs the
information into the database if an inmate completes the grievance form correctly. Id.
Otherwise, the form is returned to the inmate. Id.
279. See, e.g., PRISON L. OFF., HOW TO FILE A CDCR ADMINISTRATIVE GRIEVANCE AND
APPEAL 4 (2020), https://prisonlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/AdminAppeals-June2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/MBE7-JSBH] (mentioning that inmates in some California state
prison facilities may be able to submit grievances through electronic kiosks or tablets).
280. See, e.g., Nance v. SCO Francis Danley, No. 17-6409, 2021 WL 2592931, at *2
(D.N.J. June 23, 2021) (referencing the New Jersey DOC’s electronic JPAY System for
submitting grievances electronically via the unit kiosk); State ex rel. Wolfenbarger v. Mohr,
No. 18AP-508, 2019 WL 4447406, at *4 app. (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2019) (describing how,
in 2017, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction implemented JPAY grievance
kiosks and replaced its paper-based grievance procedure with an electronic system); Ga. Dep’t
of Corr., Standard Operating Procedures (2019), https://www.powerdms.com/public/
GADOC/documents/105711 [https://perma.cc/LX6X-Z6WK].
281. Cf. Goodrick, 2020 WL 6371160, at *2 (describing the limited discretion that the
Idaho grievance process leaves to the grievance coordinator over whether to upload the
grievance information into the database); PRISON JUST. LEAGUE, supra note 166, at 20 (noting
that in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice grievance staff misplace or lose Texas state
prisoners’ grievances in some cases).

2021]

PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT

175

longer need to spend time logging grievances themselves. Instead, they can
focus on addressing the underlying issues presented by the grievances.282
Several states have already understood the added benefits of an electronic
grievance system.283 Using paper forms, on the other hand, can create a
whole host of problems. For example, in December 2015, the New York
Times reported how Eastern District of New York Judge John Gleeson
rebuked the New York State grievance process when presiding over a former
inmate’s case, which alleged prison guard abuse.284 Judge Gleeson stated
that the particular guard had been the target of other abuse claims brought by
inmates, but that those grievances were handwritten and deeply buried away
in the prison’s arcane filing system.285 At the time, prison officials had no
way of adequately tracking potential problems with particular guards.286
However, in response to criticism, the New York State Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision indicated that it had begun
electronically logging complaints to allow the department to better monitor
accusations of misconduct and change bad practices.287
Despite these potential benefits, the primary anticipated objection to
making this transition is financial. For states that do not have a system in
place already, implementing a database and kiosks or electronic tablets, can
be a costly undertaking. Moreover, given that some states have complicated
their grievance procedures and enacted their own analogous PLRA schemes,
there is some doubt as to whether states would be open to making a process
more seamless.288 However, in the long term, having a system that allows
state officials to spend more time addressing grievances and monitoring for
potential problems generates significant cost savings and improves prison
conditions overall, leading to state officials facing less costly lawsuits in the
future. This reasoning is consistent with the Supreme Court’s assumption in
Woodford that “[c]orrections officials concerned about maintaining order in
their institutions have a reason for creating and retaining grievance systems
that provide—and that are perceived by prisoners as providing—a
meaningful opportunity for prisoners to raise meritorious grievances.”289
The fact that some states have already undergone the transition to electronic
systems signals recognition that the benefits outweigh any anticipated costs.
282. See N.Y.C. BD. OF CORR., A STUDY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION INMATE
GRIEVANCE AND REQUEST PROGRAM 13 (2016), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/boc/downloads/
pdf/final_board_of_correctionreport_oct2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YSP-EXKH].
283. See supra note 280; see also Robbins, supra note 272.
284. See Robbins, supra note 272.
285. Id.
286. See id.
287. See id.; see also Shannon Heffernan, The Way Prisoners Flag Guard Abuse,
Inadequate Health Care and Unsanitary Conditions Is Broken, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 2, 2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-way-prisoners-flag-guard-abuseinadequate-health-care-and-unsanitary-conditions-is-broken [https://perma.cc/Q6QF-S8QY]
(reporting that the Illinois DOC stated that it would be transitioning to electronic grievances
in light of major problems with the grievance system, “a move that would make the system
more efficient and data easier to track”).
288. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
289. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 102 (2006).
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2. Step Two: Granting Outside Legal Aid Organizations Access to
Electronic Grievance Databases
The first step serves as a prerequisite for implementing the second step.
Once states have electronic grievance processes with corresponding
databases in place, states should ensure the appropriate legal aid
organizations that typically litigate prisoner civil rights cases are provided
with database access. With instant access to prisons’ grievance databases,
these organizations can monitor grievances and identify prisoners’
apparently meritorious complaints, which are thus worthy of attorney
representation. Once identified, these organizations can decide whether to
assist selected inmates through the prison grievance process to ensure that, if
prisoners wish to file lawsuits, they will have properly exhausted their
administrative remedies per Woodford.290 If an organization does not have
the capacity to take on a particular case,291 it can reach out to private law
firms to determine whether the firms can provide pro bono assistance. This
part of the framework therefore envisions not only an initial sharing of
grievances with appropriate legal aid organizations but also a collaboration
between public and private attorneys to better connect lawyers willing to take
on prisoners’ civil rights lawsuits with prisoners themselves.
This Note argues that such a process can directly counteract the PLRA’s
access provisions’ cumulative application to meritorious prisoner civil rights
lawsuits. First, having a more seamless process to connect inmates with pro
bono lawyers from the initial filing of a grievance enhances the probability
of attorney representation prior to filing a civil rights complaint in court, thus
increasing the odds the complaint will survive dismissal.292 As mentioned
previously, inmates have not historically had such a process, and this lack of
a process has contributed to the existing difficulties in finding lawyers ready
to take on prisoner civil rights cases.293 This proposal therefore combats the
disincentives exacerbated by the PLRA’s attorney’s fee limitations by
connecting inmates with meritorious claims to attorneys who are willing to
assist.294
Second, having attorney representation from the start of the grievance
process ensures that inmates are counseled to properly exhaust administrative
remedies. With many people in prison suffering from a combination of

290. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 79–84 and accompanying text. As described previously, when an
inmate moves to appoint counsel in a given case, it typically occurs after they already may
have made errors warranting dismissal.
293. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
294. This Note’s proposal seeks to build on preexisting infrastructure to connect attorneys
with prisoners who have meritorious civil rights claims. However, others have argued for the
creation of a new organization to provide inmates with legal assistance for their civil rights
claims. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 184, at 226–34 (arguing for the creation of a new
organization called Prison Lawyers, which would be funded by the Ninth Circuit).
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different disadvantages, including illiteracy, legal assistance throughout the
grievance process can make a significant difference in outcome.295
Third, although this Note’s proposal directly targets the PLRA’s
administrative exhaustion and attorney’s fee provisions, it can indirectly and
positively impact the filing fee and three-strikes rule provisions.296 For
example, pro bono attorneys can assist with covering the initial filing fee to
avoid the case’s outright dismissal, even if an inmate has previously acquired
three strikes, thus lessening the financial burden on inmates filing a civil
rights lawsuit. Additionally, attorney representation from the very start can
help inmates avoid any pitfalls that may lead to acquiring a “strike.”
This Note’s proposal ultimately aims to facilitate and restore federal
litigation as a critical transparency mechanism for people in America’s
prisons. Allowing prisoner grievances to be instantly accessible to outside
lawyers provides prisoners with meritorious claims an opportunity to share
their otherwise hidden experiences with the outside world. Doing so also
creates an ongoing external oversight mechanism to continuously monitor
the issues affecting people in prison on a daily basis.
Aside from electronic grievance database sharing, this proposal builds on
already existing infrastructure in some states. For example, PLS—an
established nonprofit organization that litigates New York prisoners’ civil
rights cases—has a Pro Bono Partnership Program (PBPP) that aims to
expand legal services to prisoners by recruiting attorneys to represent
prisoners on a pro bono basis.297 The PBPP receives cases from PLS,
conducts an initial review of the merits of those cases, and upon determining
that a case is worthy of representation, PBPP staff contact volunteers
individually to arrange for a case referral.298 This Note’s proposal capitalizes
on this sort of existing infrastructure while streamlining the process by which
a legal aid organization is made aware of prisoners’ complaints in the first
place.
Despite the potential benefits of this second step, state DOCs are likely to
be wary of exposing daily prison life to outsiders. State DOCs may not want
increased external scrutiny of prisons coming from independent legal
organizations. In line with responses to public disclosure requests, they are
likely to insulate information about prison conditions as much as possible.299
However, unlike public disclosure requests, prisoners’ grievances would not
be shared with the public at large, avoiding any concerns regarding the
security or safety of the facility itself and those inside. Moreover, having
independent oversight by external legal aid organizations is beneficial in the
long term, as it increases transparency of prison conditions to those whose

295. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
296. See supra Parts II.B.2–3.
297. See Pro Bono Partnership Program, PRISONERS’ LEGAL SERVS. OF N.Y.,
https://plsny.org/pro-bono-partnership-program/ [https://perma.cc/6VS3-UA63] (last visited
Aug. 9, 2021).
298. See id.
299. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
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mission it is to ultimately improve them.300 While such external involvement
may seem, at first glance, to benefit only incarcerated individuals, it can also
create safer institutions for correctional staff,301 providing an additional
critical incentive for implementing such a framework. While this Note’s
proposed framework is just a first step, it aims to make significant strides to
ensure that the intended purpose of the PLRA is fulfilled, although no longer
at the expense of meritorious prisoner civil litigation.
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the PLRA to reduce the perceived rise in frivolous
prisoner litigation. Despite statements to the contrary, the PLRA’s access
provisions deter and obstruct prisoners’ ability to file and succeed on
meritorious civil rights claims. With recent events such as the COVID-19
pandemic leaving people in prison more vulnerable than ever before and
without indication that the PLRA will be significantly amended or repealed,
states must begin to take proactive steps to counteract the PLRA’s effect on
meritorious prisoner lawsuits. This Note’s proposed framework is suggested
as a practical means not only to collaterally attack the PLRA’s provisions
restricting prisoners’ access to court but also to facilitate a meaningful debate
over how to best navigate a reality in which the PLRA remains intact.

300. See Deitch, supra note 23, at 236 (arguing for creativity and increased transparency
in prison operations).
301. See Deitch, supra note 35, at 219–21 (explaining how, although correctional
administrators often give the greatest pushback to external oversight, they nevertheless are the
second beneficiaries of such oversight).

